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U.S. tax reforms in the 1980s have changed substantially the relative
attractiveness of operating in partnership form relative to corporate form.
They have also changed the desirability of debt financing relative to equity
financing, both of domestic operations and of foreign subsidiaries. And
whereas the 1981 Tax Act encouraged mergers and acquisitions among
U.S. corporations, the 1986 Act discouraged such transactions. Moreover,
these Acts had the opposite effect on incentives of foreign companies to
acquire U.S. businesses. In this paper, we attempt to show that these
apparently disparate claims are all implied from a common (and simple)
framework. Moreover, we present empirical evidence to support the
claims.
I. CORPORATIONS VERSUS PARTNERSHIPS
To a degree that is historically unprecedented, the corporate form of
organization was made tax disfavored relative to partnerships in the
United States with the passage of the 1986 Tax Act. Corporate tax rates2 Scholes & Wolfson
were set above the rate that applies to high-income individuals on ordi-
nary income (the tax rate that individuals face on partnership income).
Moreover, the United States imposes tax at two levels on corporate
income, but only one level on partnership income. The second level of
tax, at the shareholder level, was increased dramatically with the 1986
Tax Act, relative to ordinary tax rates. This was done by making capital
gains taxable at the same rate as ordinary income is taxed (whereas
capital gains had previously been taxed at favorable rates) and by elimi-
nating some important opportunities to postpone the shareholder-level
tax (such as by eliminating the ability to postpone tax through the use of
installment sales of publicly traded securities).
The United States is out of sync with most of the rest of the world in
taxing corporate income so heavily relative to noncorporate income. In
most other countries, corporate income is taxed more favorably either by
allowing shareholders to take a tax credit for corporate taxes they pay
indirectly as shareholders, by imposing low shareholder-level tax rates,
or by imposing relatively low corporate-level tax rates.
To illustrate the tax-disfavored nature of investing in corporations
relative to partnerships in the United States, suppose the corporate tax
rate is 35% and the personal tax rate on partnership income, dividend
income, and capital gains, is 30%. Then each dollar of income earned at
the partnership level yields a tax obligation of 30tf, whereas, the same
dollar of income earned at the corporate level yields corporate tax of 35<£,
enabling a 65<£ dividend or capital gain to be "distributed" to the share-
holders. This 65tf dividend or capital gain in turn will trigger an addi-
tional 19.5tf in personal tax, so the total tax burden on the dollar of
corporate income becomes 54.5<J.
To put into perspective the significance of the tax disadvantage of the
corporate tax treatment, the corporate project must earn 54% more before
tax to yield the same after-tax return to shareholders as the same invest-
ment undertaken in partnership form provides to partners. This can be
seen by noting that the after-tax returns are equal when
or
R, 1-
For tp = 30%, tc = 35%, and ts = 30%, (1 - fp)/[(l - tc) (1 - Q] = 1.54, so Rc must exceed R by 54% to yield the same after-tax return to investors.The Role of Tax Rules 3
The example above overstates the degree to which corporations are tax
disfavored relative to partnerships under the 1986 Tax Act. First, unless
all corporate profits are distributed to shareholders each period as divi-
dends, the shareholder-level tax can be deferred until shareholders sell
their shares. This reduces the present value of the shareholder-level tax.
Second, if shareholder tax rates vary over time, shareholders may time
their stock sales to coincide with periods of low tax rates. Third, certain
shareholders may be able to avoid the shareholder-level tax on capital
gains by holding their shares until death or by making a charitable contri-
bution of their shares (although such gifts may trigger the alternative
minimum tax). Fourth, shareholders may anticipate that capital gains tax
rates will be reduced in the future at a time preceding the date at which
they will have sold their shares. And fifth, equity financing is not the
only type of financing available to corporations. Many of the financing
alternatives reduce the entity-level tax by permitting tax-deductible dis-
tributions to capital suppliers. These include debt, employee compensa-
tion, leases, and royalties. We will return to this point later.
II. DEFERRAL
To illustrate the importance of deferral, suppose the corporation were to
pursue a policy of paying no dividends, reinvesting after-corporate-tax
profits in the firm. Suppose further that investors were to hold their
investment positions for a period of 10 years before selling and trigger-
ing a capital gains tax on 10 years of share appreciation. Finally, suppose
that the pretax return available on partnership projects is 10%, so that,
after tax, partnership investments yield 7%. Then the required before-
tax rate of return on corporate projects would become 40% above the
required return on partnership projects. This is down from a 54% re-
quired premium when the shareholder-level tax was paid each period.
One way to calibrate the magnitude of the deferral benefit is to note that
paying the shareholder-level tax at a 30% rate at the end of ten years is
equivalent to paying the tax at a 23.2% rate each year.
1
If the shareholders' investment horizon were to increase to 20 years,
the required corporate pretax premium would drop further to 31%. On
the other hand, there may be nontax costs associated with extending the
investment horizon. To the extent that there are, we overstate the value
of tax deferral, and this increases the require premium on corporate
projects even further.
1 This can be seen by noting that RJR = (l-fp)/[(l-fc)(l-£s)], substituting values of 1.4 for
RJRp, 30% for tp, 35% for tc, and solving for ts.4 Scholes & Wolfson
III. FAVORABLE CAPITAL RATES TAX RATES
If the shareholders' investment horizon were 10 years, but the capital
gains tax rate were only 70% of ordinary tax rates (that is, 30% of capital
gains were excluded from taxable income), the required rate of return on
corporate projects would still be 28% above the required rate on partner-
ship projects. This is down from a 40% premium when capital gains are
subjected to a full tax at ordinary rates.
The calculations above assume that shareholders receive all of their
return in the form of capital gains. The required premium on corporate
projects increases considerably with the dividend yield. The reasons for
this include an increase in the fraction of income taxed at ordinary tax
rates (rather than favorable capital gains tax rates) and an acceleration of
the payment of the tax (reduced value of deferral).
IV. FOREIGN INVESTORS
It is worth noting that the tax disadvantage of the corporate form does
not apply to all investors. Certain foreign investors, for example, actu-
ally find corporations to be the tax-favored organizational form through
which to invest in the United States.
To illustrate, suppose a foreign investor faces a home-country tax rate
on ordinary income of 50% and a home-country capital gains tax rate of
0%. The home country taxes ordinary income from U.S. partnerships as
the income is earned and grants a tax credit for any U.S. taxes paid. If a
partnership generated a pretax return of 10% on invested capital, a for-
eign investor in the U.S. partnership would earn 10% (1-50%) or 5%
after tax.
2
What pretax rate of return would a nondividend-paying U.S. corpora-
tion have to earn to provide the same 5% after-tax return that the U.S.
partnership provides? Since the United States exempts capital gains
earned by foreign investors, and since there is no U.S. withholding tax
when the corporate profits are distributed to foreign investors by way of
a sale of stock, the after-tax return to the foreign investor becomes Rc(l —
tc us). Here, tc us denotes the U.S. corporate tax rate and is assumed to be equal to 35%. Then Rc need only be equal to 5%/(l - .35) or 7.69% to
yield the required 5% after-tax return to our foreign investors. So, the
2 Since the home country credits any U.S. taxes paid, it does not matter to the foreign
investor whether the U.S. tax was paid or not.The Role of Tax Rules 5
foreign investor would require the U.S. corporation to generate a pretax
profit that is 23% less than would be required of a partnership at the
same time that a U.S. investor might require the corporation to earn
substantially more than a partnership earns. Note how this phenome-
non sows the seeds for conflict in desirable investment strategies among
various classes of shareholders.
V. COMPARISON OF CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS BEFORE THE 1986 TAX ACT
Corporate equity investments were not always so tax disfavored relative
to partnerships as they appear to be in the United States today. For
example, prior to the 1986 Tax Act, the top personal tax rate on ordinary
income was 50%, the corporate tax rate on ordinary income was 46%,
and long-term capital gains were taxed at 40% of ordinary taxes, a maxi-
mum rate of 20%. If we once again assume that partnership projects
yielded 10% before personal taxes, and that shareholders defer the
shareholder-level tax on capital gains for 10 years, then corporate proj-
ects would have to earn only 11% more pretax profit than partnership
projects to yield the same after-tax return to high-income investors.
Or consider the situation in the 1960s for investors facing personal tax
rates on ordinary income of up to 70%, a capital gains tax rate of up to
35% (or half of the ordinary tax rate), and a corporate tax rate of 48%.
Here we find the required return on corporate projects to be below that
on partnership projects. To provide the same after-tax return as a 10%
partnership project, the corporation would only need to earn 8.34%
before corporate tax. This is 17% less than the required return on partner-
ship projects.
VI. TAX INCENTIVES INTRODUCED
BY THE 1986 TAX ACT
Two types of tax-planning incentives follow from the fact that corporate
equity investments are tax disfavored relative to investments that avoid
an entity-level tax following the 1986 Tax Act: to undertake activity in the
non(regular) corporate form, and to finance corporate activities in ways
that avoid as much entity-level tax as possible.
As for the first of these incentives, it is worth noting the explosion of
so-called S-Corporation elections (where the corporation chooses to have
taxable income passed through to the tax returns of its owners without
the payment of an entity-level tax) surrounding year-end 1986. S-6 Scholes & Wolfson
Corporations are limited liability corporations that are not taxed at the
entity level so long as a number of restrictive conditions are met. For all
practical purposes, large corporations cannot avail themselves of this
status. Whereas 75,000 of such elections were made throughout 1985,
three times this number of elections (or 225,000) were made in the 5 weeks
surrounding year-end 1986.
Despite the tax advantages of doing so, the vast majority of corpora-
tions did not restructure their businesses in ways that would allow them
to avoid facing an entity-level tax. There are a host of nontax factors that
make this a sensible strategy.
The nontax advantages of operating in corporate form include liquid-
ity, more clearly defined property rights under law, and a more efficient
market for organizational control to discipline nonowner management.
Moreover, there are both tax and nontax costs to change an entity's legal
organizational form. In this respect, there is an important distinction to
be drawn between tax planning for a new firm and tax planning for a
seasoned firm.
Given a strategy of operating in regular corporate form, there are clear
tax implications for corporate capital structure. Note, for example, that if
all corporate pretax profit could be distributed to investors in the form of
tax-deductible interest, rather than nondeductible dividends and capital
gains, the required return on corporate projects would be equal to that
on partnership projects. The reason, of course, is that the entity-level tax
would be eviscerated under such a capital structure policy.
It should be noted, however, that the tax advantages of debt financing
disappear for firms that are unprofitable. For such firms, the interest on
debt yields no current tax benefits. It is typically better for such firms to
issue securities that are tax favored in the hands of investors, like com-
mon or preferred stock. Such securities yield implicit tax deductions to
the issuer, because investors are willing to accept lower risk-adjusted
expected returns for these tax-favored securities.
VII. MITIGATING ENTITY-LEVEL TAXATION
THROUGH INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
Myriad investment projects yield tax deductions and tax credits that
allow the statutory tax to be postponed or eliminated altogether. Exam-
ples of such investments include research and development projects,
capital intensive projects that yield accelerated depreciation, and oil and
gas exploration projects. Because such tax-favored investments bear im-
plicit tax, however, they generally will not result in elimination of anThe Role of Tax Rules 7
entity-level tax. For example, if fully taxable investment projects yield
10% pretax, while tax-favored investment projects of equal risk that
yield no corporate-level taxable income yield 7% pretax, then the corpo-
ration bears an implicit tax at the rate of 30% on pretax corporate profits.
To the extent this implicit tax rate is less than the statutory corporate tax
rate, investment in tax-favored assets can succeed in mitigating the
entity-level tax on corporate equity investments. But the presence of
implicit taxes prevents the entity-level tax from being eliminated.
In fact, the presence of implicit taxes makes it impossible to eliminate
the entity-level tax by adjusting the capital structure. For example, debt
financing no longer succeeds in distributing corporate profits in a way
that avoids the corporate-level tax in the presence of implicit tax. The
reason is identical to why debt financing is not desirable when the corpo-
ration is unprofitable: that is, interest deductions yield tax benefits only
when entity-level taxable income is positive. But when the corporation
pursues tax-favored investments, income is not fully (explicitly) taxed.
This prevents interest from yielding tax deductions that lead to a full
corporate tax reduction.
If the corporation invests in tax-favored assets that bear no explicit
tax and only implicit tax, shareholders cannot avoid double taxation.
Ignoring nontax factors that influence the desirability of issuing debt,
this implies that corporations should avoid investing in tax-favored
assets even when they face higher tax rates than other investors in the
marketplace.
To see this, note that investing in explicitly taxed assets yielding
pretax return Rc, financed with debt bearing interest equal to the pretax
income on these investments, yields the following return to investors:
Corporate return before interest and taxes Rc
Corporate interest expense (Rc)
Corporate return after interest expense 0
Corporate tax 0
Personal interest income Rc
Personal tax on interest income (Ktp)
Total return to investors after tax Rc(l - tp)
That is, the entity-level tax is avoided. By contrast, if the corporation
invests in explicitly tax-exempt assets bearing implicit tax at rate tu corpo-
rate investors earn
*c(i - h) (i - g8 Scholes & Wolfson
This is lower than the return on a debt-financed investment in fully
taxable assets by fraction tv
VIII. EFFECT OF LIMITS TO DEBT FINANCING
Although U.S. corporations cannot avoid, by issuing debt, the double
taxation of returns on tax-favored projects that bear implicit taxes, this
does not imply that tax-favored investments should be avoided by corpo-
rations. After all, there are both tax and nontax limitations on debt
financing. On the tax side, there is the question of whether the taxing
authority will permit unlimited deductibility of interest on debt. In other
words, there is always a risk that debt will be recharacterized as equity
by the taxing authority (Code Section 385).
As for nontax factors, the secondary market for debt securities is much
less liquid than the secondary markets for equity securities. As a conse-
quence, debtholders may require an illiquidity premium to be induced to
lend funds to the corporation. Debt may also give rise to significant
bankruptcy or workout costs. Although debt financing can also yield
nontax benefits relating to management incentives, it is clear that the
costs are perceived by corporate managers to overwhelm the benefits at
high ratios of debt as a fraction of total capitalization.
IX. EVIDENCE ON DEBT FINANCING
Net new borrowings by the U.S. corporations exploded in the 1980s.
From less than half a trillion dollars of outstanding corporate bonds at
year-end 1980, corporate bonds outstanding increased to nearly 600 bil-
lion dollars by year-end 1983, to nearly 800 billion dollars by year-end
1985, and to nearly $1,400 billion by year-end 1988.
At the same time, there was a dramatic reduction in the supply of
equity securities. Share repurchases averaged $37 billion per year from
1984 to 1986 and amounted to $54 billion in 1987. This compares with
only $5 billion per year from 1978 to 1983. Other equity retirements by
way of corporate acquisitions from $15 billion per year from 1980 to 1983
to $75 billion per year from 1984 to 1986.
It is interesting to note that the trend toward greater debt financing
that occurred in the United States in the 1980s was much less dramatic
elsewhere around the world. This is consistent with our argument that
the corporate form of organization is simply not (very) tax disfavored in
countries other than the United States.The Role of Tax Rules 9
X. INCENTIVES OF U.S. MULTINATIONALS
TO INCREASE DEBT FINANCING
OF FOREIGN OPERATIONS
The 1986 Tax Act also encouraged U.S. multinational companies to in-
crease their debt financing of foreign subsidiaries. The 1986 Tax Act
made the United States a tax haven relative to many other countries.
Because the United States credits foreign taxes paid only up to the U.S.
tax rate, the 1986 Tax Act caused many U.S. multinationals to face bind-
ing foreign tax credit limitations. This means that U.S. multinationals
began to pay tax on foreign income at a rate above the U.S. rate in many
circumstances. Just as debt financing of U.S. corporations allows some
corporate profits to avoid an entity-level tax, so debt financing of foreign
operations allows some foreign profits to avoid being taxed locally at tax
rates above the U.S. corporate rates.
XI. THE EFFECTS OF THE 1981 AND 1986
TAX ACTS ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The 1981 Tax Act encouraged mergers and acquisitions in several ways.
The introduction of the accelerated-cost-recovery-system (ACRS) depre-
ciation provided incentives to "step up" the basis of depreciable assets
and to change depreciation schedules to ones that were much more highly
accelerated than existed previously. In addition, the Installment Sales
Revision Act passed in October of 1980 promoted asset sales by making
installment notes a more effective way of reducing the tax costs relating to
depreciation recapture and capital gains than previously was the case.
The introduction of ACRS depreciation in conjunction with making
investment tax credits more generous in 1981 also gave rise to an in-
crease in net operating loss and tax credit carryforwards on corporate
balance sheets. This along with very high interest rates encouraged merg-
ers and acquisitions. High interest rates are relevant because carry-
forwards diminish in value when discount rates are high.
In contrast to the 1981 Act, the 1986 Tax Act discouraged asset sales
among domestic taxpayers (but did not discourage such transactions
between domestic sellers and foreign buyers as we will see later) in a
number of important respects:
• by reducing tax rates, thereby reducing the size of the potential gains
from stepping up asset basis;10 Scholes & Wolf son
• by eliminating the so-called General Utilities doctrine, thereby elimi-
nating the opportunity to avoid a corporate-level tax on capital gains
in the event of corporate liquidation;
• by introducing less generous depreciation schedules;
• by introducing more stringent rules regarding the availability of net
operating loss and other tax attribute carryforwards in the event of
merger;
• by increasing the capital gains tax rate at both the corporate and per-
sonal levels;
• by reducing substantially the ability to use installment sales to post-
pone taxes; and
• by increasing the amount of ordinary income that must be recaptured
in a corporate liquidation.
As for the evidence, Table 1 displays annual merger and acquisition
activity between 1970 and 1987 in three ways: in nominal dollars, in
constant 1986 Consumer Price Index (CPI) dollars, and in dollars of
constant 1986 Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index of stock prices. Note
the near doubling of activity between 1980 and 1981 despite weakness in
the U.S. economy around this time. This increase in activity is especially
impressive given that the Act was not signed into law until August 1981
and the President's proposal was not made until March 1981.
In fact, the activity in the first quarter of 1981 was no greater than that
in the fourth quarter of 1980. But there was a doubling in the dollar value
of activity in the second quarter and another 40% increase in the third
quarter.
Note further that the average level of activity increased fivefold in
nominal dollar terms between 1970-1980 and 1981-1986. The increase in
constant CPI dollars was threefold, and there was a doubling in volume
even after adjusting for the increase in the level of stock prices.
Whereas the 1981 Tax Act is associated with an increase in merger
activity, the 1986 Act should have discouraged transactions among U.S.
businesses. However, taxpayers were given a one-quarter window of
opportunity to undertake transactions prior to the effective date of the
1986 Tax Act.
Table 2 shows two things. First, there was a bulge in activity during the
fourth quarter of 1986. The volume was a record in nominal, real, and S&P
500-adjusted dollars for at least the preceding 50 years. The volume of
activity exceeded the average over the eight surrounding quarters by 85%.
Second, the table reveals a decline in activity over the four quarters of 1987
relative to the four quarters preceding the passage of the 1986 Act by 20%
in nominal dollars, 23% in constant CPI dollars, and 38% inThe Role of Tax Rules 11
TABLE 1
Merger and Acquisition Values: Nominal Dollar, Constant Dollar, and














































































































Sources: W.T. Grimm (Mergerstat) for 1968-1985 nominal values; Mergers & Acquisitions for 1986-1987
nominal values; 1985 Economic Report of the President Industry Week for consumer prices; 1985-1987
Ibbotson Associates (Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation) for S&P 500 index values.
constant S&P 500 dollars. Moreover, Table 2 ignores the secular trend in
merger and acquisition activity. If the series is detrended using data in the
1970s, the decline in activity in 1987 becomes 37% in nominal dollars, 32%
in constant CPI dollars, and 45% in constant S&P 500 dollars.
The decline in merger and acquisition activity in 1987 is all the more
impressive given that it includes leveraged buyouts. Given the en-
hanced tax advantages of debt financing introduced by the 1986 Tax Act,12 Scholes & Wolf son
TABLE 2
Merger and Acquisition Values: Nominal Dollar, Constant Dollar,
















































































































1 Prob denotes the probability that the sum of the ranks in the four quarters preceding 1986-4 could be
as low or lower than the sum of the ranks in the four quarters succeeding 1986-4 by chance alone.
Sources: Mergers & Acquisitions for nominal values; Industry Week for consumer prices; Ibbotson Associ-
ates (Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation) for S&P 500 index values.
the incidence of leveraged buyouts would not necessarily be expected to
fall. Indeed, the resurgence of acquisition activity in 1988 is heavily
weighted toward highly leveraged transactions. But another important
component of acquisition activity that has been on the rise since 1986 is
foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses. As explained next, this is quite
consistent with the incentives provided by the 1986 Tax Act.
XII. INVESTMENT AND REPATRIATIONS POLICIES
FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS FACING
WORLDWIDE TAX SYSTEMS
Although tax systems around the world have a great deal in common,
they also differ from one another along a variety of dimensions: marginalThe Role of Tax Rules 13
tax rates can vary from essentially 0% in certain tax haven countries to
well over 60% in certain high-tax countries; the definition of income can
vary dramatically from country to country; the use of nonincome taxes
can vary substantially; taxpayers may be taxed only on domestic income
or on worldwide income.
To avoid double taxation of income (once in the host country and once
in the home country), countries that tax worldwide income also provide
a tax credit for foreign taxes paid. But countries differ in their generosity
regarding foreign tax credits. Moreover foreign tax credits typically ap-
ply only to income taxes. Value added taxes, for example, are not refund-
able via foreign tax credits in most countries, including the United
States. Instead, any value added tax paid is allowed only to be taken as a
tax deduction, and as a result, only the fraction of the nonincome tax
paid equal to the taxpayer's marginal income tax rate will effectively be
refunded. Just as with value added taxes, implicit taxes paid in a foreign
tax jurisdiction on tax-favored investment are often not refundable. By
implicit taxes, we mean the reduced level of pretax return the investor
earns by investing in tax-favored assets that result from competition for
the right to own such assets.
For example, a tax-sheltered investment made by a foreign investor in
the United States prior to the 1986 Tax Act might result in no payment of
explicit tax to the U.S. Treasury Department. Competition for the right to
hold such assets would cause the pretax return available on the invest-
ment to be less than that available on less tax-favored assets. The reduced
pretax return represents an implicit tax paid by the investor. On repatria-
tion of U.S. earnings back to the tax home of the foreign investor, the
foreign investor may be subjected to taxation on the income earned in the
United States, but since no explicit U.S. tax was paid, the investor would
receive no foreign tax credit. On the other hand, the implicit tax paid will
imply a reduced level of income available for repatriation and therefore a
reduced level of home-country taxable income. As such, the implicit tax
will give rise to a tax deduction (but not a credit) in the home country.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the availability of generous
investment tax credits and highly accelerated depreciation made many
investments in the United States highly tax favored. As a result, such
investments bore a high level of implicit taxes. Moreover, U.S. mar-
ginal tax rates were roughly of the same order of magnitude as most
other industrialized countries over this period of time. To the extent
that implicit taxes are not completely recoverable from their home coun-
try on repatriation of profits from U.S. investment, foreign investors
were disadvantaged relative to U.S. investors during the 1981-1986
period. This is explained more fully below.14 Scholes & Wolfson
The 1986 Tax Act favors foreign investment in the United States in
several ways. It taxes many U.S. investments much less favorably rela-
tive to ordinary income-producing assets, such as bonds, thereby elimi-
nating much of the implicit tax on active investments. The Act also
reduced U.S. tax rates relative to those in most of the other industrial-
ized countries. Finally, foreign investors in many countries do not face
double taxation of corporate profits as we illustrated earlier. Since the
1986 Tax Act increases the shareholder-level tax to U.S. investors by
more than it increases the shareholder-level tax to many foreign inves-
tors (recall that the United States does not tax capital gains from the sale
of corporate stock by foreign investors), foreigners should find U.S.
investments relatively attractive now.
Because income from foreign passive investments, like interest in-
come, often escapes taxation in the foreign country, whereas income
from active investments, like operating a business, does not, the pretax
return on passive investments is typically less sensitive to local tax rates
than is the pretax return on active investments. This means that in
countries where the statutory tax rate is low, marginal investments by
local residents will typically be in passive assets since the rate available
on them will exceed the pretax rate on active assets in such countries.
3 In
addition, the ability of foreigners to invest in active assets at a low
marginal tax rate, until profits are repatriated to the home country, will
cause foreign investors to be the marginal players in active assets.
The primer that follows develops optimal investment and rein-
vestment policies for multinational firms facing a worldwide tax struc-
ture similar to that in existence in the United States. To keep things
simple, only two tax jurisdictions are considered, so issues relating to
country-by-country versus worldwide foreign tax credit limitations do
not arise. In addition, only two kinds of assets are considered: active
and passive.
Suppose that you can invest abroad to earn at the rate of Rt pretax. The
local tax rate is tf. Each unit of capital invested abroad then grows at rate
Rf(l - tf) or rt each year before considering any additional home-country
tax on repatriation.
The home-country tax rate is td. Assume that td > tt. Taxable income
earned abroad will be taxed in the home country on repatriation (that is,
a worldwide tax system is assumed), but a foreign tax credit will be
allowed for foreign taxes paid. On repatriation, then, the foreign invest-
3 Naturally, to avoid arbitrage possibilities, this requires an inability to effect costlessly
short sales of active assets in the low-tax country for which an ordinary tax deduction can
be taken on any losses from holding the short position.The Role of Tax Rules 15
merit will attract additional tax at the rate of td - tf on all taxable income
generated abroad.
If home-country investment yields Rd pretax each period, under what
conditions is investing abroad preferred to investing in the home coun-
try? This can be determined as follows.
After-tax accumulation from investing n periods abroad, followed by
repatriation to the home country (per unit of domestic currency invested):
1. Local after-tax accumulation in n [1 + Rf(l - tt)]
n = (1 + rf)"
years:
2. Total foreign taxable income [(1 + r£)" - 1]/(1 - t()
• Except for initial investment,
each unit of after-tax income
is the result of generating
1/(1 - tf) units of taxable income.
3. Additional domestic tax on repatria- (td — t{)[(l + r{)
n — 1]/(1 - t{)
tion
• All taxable income will be
taxed at rate td less a foreign
tax credit at the rate t{.
4. After-tax accumulation, after tax on (1 + rf)"(l - td) + (td - t()
repatriation: (1) - (3) (1 - t() (1 - t()
5. How does this compare with domes- [1 + Rd(l - td)]
n = (1 + rdf
tic investment for n years?
For n = 1, foreign investment yields [substituting into (4) and noting
1 + Rf(l - td)
whereas domestic investment yields
i + *d(i - y
Over such a short investment horizon, R( must exceed Rd to favor
investment abroad.
For example, suppose an investment of $6 million can be made in one
of two mutually exclusive projects, one foreign and one domestic. The
foreign project is expected to return 25% after local tax, where the tax
rate is also 25%. The domestic project is expected to earn only 20% after
domestic tax, where the tax rate is 40%. If the investment is made16 Scholes & Wolf son
abroad, assume that all profits and the investment will be repatriated at
the end of 1 year. Which project is preferred?
Our calculations above reveal that the decision should be based on




l-tt 1 - .25
rd -20
1- L 1 - .40
= 33V3%
As a result, it is a matter of indifference! To see this, note that the $6
million invested abroad yields taxable income of $2 million, tax of $0.5
million, and after-tax income of $1.5 million. This results in a repatriation
of ($6 + $1.5 or) $7.5 million. The repatriation triggers additional domestic
tax of (40% - 25% or) 15% on the taxable income of $2 million or $0.3
million. This leaves ($7.5 — $0.3 or) $7.2 million after repatriation tax. This
is equal to a 20% after-tax increment on the $6 million investment, exactly
the same as would result from investment in the domestic project.
Now suppose that the investment horizon increases. In fact, let us
consider the other extreme (permanent investment abroad versus domes-
tically). Foreign investment is favored when expression (4) > (1 + rd)
n.
As n becomes large, this condition is satisfied if, and only if, rf > rd.
Recall that for n = 1, the required condition was Rf > Rd. So as the
investment horizon lengthens, we can have R{ < Rd (that is, pretax rates
of return abroad falling short of domestic pretax rates of return) and yet
investment abroad will be preferred due to the opportunity to reinvest
abroad at higher after-tax rates. This is the condition currently faced by
many foreign investors vis-a-vis U.S. investment.
Returning to our earlier example, where R{ - Rd — 33V3% and t( = 25%
and td = £0%, an investment horizon of n > 1 years would favor foreign in-
vestment. Over a 5-year horizon, for example, the foreign investment
would result in an after-tax repatriation of $15.85 million [substituting into
expression (4)], whereas domestic investment would accumulate to $14.93
million after tax or nearly $1 million less on this $6 million investment.
XIII. Implicit Taxes and Foreign Investment Incentives:
Example
Suppose you have $100 million to invest in one of two mutually exclu-
sive projects: one at home and the other, of equal risk, located in a lower




1 Implicit tax to invest abroad = 22-20/22
2 22% (1-55%) = 9.9%.











Why might there exist an implicit tax to investing abroad? There are
both tax and nontax reasons. For tax reasons, competition for the right to
undertake activity in a low-tax environment can naturally lead to the
pretax return being lower in the low-tax-rate environment. As for nontax
reasons, low tax rates are typically offered by the local government to
lure business that would not otherwise be undertaken in the low-tax
jurisdiction.
Where should you invest: at home at 22% pretax or abroad at 20%
pretax? Note that if the investment horizon were 1 year, investment
abroad followed by repatriation to the home country would yield an
after-tax return of only 9.0%. This compares unfavorably with the 9.9%
return available by investing at home. The reason is that the income
earned abroad is taxed at the higher of the local tax rate and the home
country tax rate, so all that matters is the pretax rate of return.
On the other hand, if profits can be reinvested abroad rather than
repatriated at the end of 1 year, the repatriation tax of 20% (that is, 55%
minus 35%) is postponed. This improves matters since the funds are
reinvested abroad at 13% rather than at 9.9%. For sufficiently long time
horizons, investing abroad dominates investing at home. So where you


















Now suppose the implicit tax abroad is made more generous (e.g., via
investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation available only locally),














































1 Example: 20% (1-35%) - 20% (55% - 35%) = 20% (1-55%) = 9%.
Note that the attractiveness of investing abroad decreases as invest-
ment incentives are introduced abroad. What's going on? Whereas ex-
plicit taxes are eligible for foreign tax credit, refundable dollar for dollar
by the home country, implicit taxes are not. Instead, implicit taxes, by
reducing pretax income, give rise to tax deductions at home rather than to
tax credits. At a 55% home-country tax rate, 45% of the implicit tax is not
refunded. So it is expensive for foreign investors to invest in assets that
yield a lot of implicit tax.
Whereas under implicit tax regime 1, investing abroad for 20 years
beats investing at home by $168 million (in 20 years), investing abroad
under implicit tax regime 3 loses to investing at home by $87 million!
And this, despite the fact that foreign investments earn 13% after local
tax under both regimes.
Now suppose that the home country is Japan. The foreign country in
regime 1 is the United States after the 1986 Tax Act: the tax rate is
roughly 35% and most operating assets in the United States do not bear
much implicit tax compared to what they used to with investment tax
credits and more rapid depreciation allowances. The foreign country in
regime 3 is the United States following the 1981 Tax Act: investment tax
credits and accelerated-cost-recovery-system (ACRS) depreciation made
new investments largely tax exempt.
What does the foregoing analysis suggest about foreign investment
incentives in the United States in 1981 and 1986? They were reduced and
increased, respectively.
Next, we turn to empirical evidence to test whether foreign direct
incentives to purchase U.S. interests increased following the introduc-The Role of Tax Rules 19
TABLE 3
Quarterly Merger and Acquisition Values: Nominal Dollar, Constant















































































































1 Prob denotes the probability that the sum of the ranks in the four quarters preceding 1986-4 could be
as high or higher than the sum of the ranks in the four quarters succeeding 1986-4 by chance alone.
Sources: Mergers & Acquisitions for nominal values; Industry Week for consumer prices; Ibbotson Associ-
ates (Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation) for S&P 500 index values.
tion of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In particular, we compare merger
and acquisition activity between U.S. companies to that in which non-
11. S. companies are represented on the buy side (see Table 3) around the
time of the passage of the 1986 Act in the United States.
The dollar volume of acquisitions of U.S. firms by U.S. companies
increased by 85% during the fourth quarter of 1986 relative to the aver-
age during the eight quarters surrounding this period. More precisely, it
increased by 66% in the fourth quarter of 1986 relative to the average
over the four preceding quarters. Then acquisitions dropped over the
four quarters of 1987 to a level roughly 20% below that in the four
quarters preceding 1986-4.
In comparison, the dollar value of U.S. acquisitions by non-U.S. com-
panies in 1986-4 increased 430% to $15.52 billion relative to the average20 Scholes & Wolfson
over the preceding four quarters of $2.93 billion.
4 The level of activity
during the fourth quarter of 1986 alone exceeded by 39% the average
annual dollar volume of such activity recorded by W. T. Grimm and
Company in their annual Mergerstat volume for the 1981-1985 period.
Moreover, while the level of acquisitions activity declined over the
four quarters of 1987, relative to 1986-4, to $11 billion per quarter, the
level of acquisitions in the four quarters of 1987 was 3.74 times as high as
during the four quarters preceding 1986-4.
5 Using a simple rank-sum
test, the ranking differences (in nominal dollars, constant dollars, or
adjusted for changes in the S&P 500 stock index) could have occurred by
chance with probability equal to only .0143.
This evidence is quite consistent with the 1986 Tax Reform Act's hav-
ing stimulated foreign demand for U.S. business. Moreover, the in-
crease in foreign demand for U.S. businesses was approximately offset
by the decrease in domestic demand for U.S. businesses. That is,
whereas U.S. purchases of U.S. businesses dropped by roughly $8 bil-
lion per quarter over the eight quarters surrounding the passage of the
1986 Tax Act, non-U.S. purchases of U.S. businesses increased by
roughly $8 billion per quarter. Absent a consideration of how changes in
tax rules affected domestic and foreign investors differently, one might
have concluded, incorrectly, that the 1986 Act was accompanied by only
a transitory shift in demand for mergers and acquisitions during the
fourth quarter of 1986.
The argument that the 1986 Tax Act should have increased foreign
investment in the United States due to the elimination of tax preferences
such as investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation runs in re-
verse in 1981. The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 accelerated
depreciation schedules sharply and liberalized investment tax credits
somewhat. It is worth noting that foreign acquisitions dropped very
sharply in the post-ERTA period, both in absolute dollar terms and rela-
tive as percentage of total acquisitions. Whereas foreign acquisitions of
U.S. companies as a percentage of total acquisitions was less than 8% in
the post-ERTA/pre-1986 Tax Reform Act period, it was over 20% of the
total both immediately before ERTA and immediately after the 1986 Tax
Act.
The analysis above ignores other factors that may have contributed to
the surge in foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses in the fourth quarter
4 The increase is 424% in real terms and 402% adjusted for changes in the level of the S&P
500 stock index.
5 Postreform activity was 3.61 times as high in constant dollar terms and 2.90 times as high
adjusted for changes in the level of the S&P 500 stock index.The Role of Tax Rules 21
of 1986. For example, concern by foreign investors over increasing trade
restrictions may have prompted acquisitions by foreign manufacturers
that sell to U.S. consumers. Another factor is the changes in the magni-
tude of the trade deficit, although this is not entirely independent of the
amount of foreign acquisitions. A related factor is currency exchange
rates. Several recent papers document an association between foreign
direct investment in the United States and the exchange rate between
the dollar and other major foreign currencies.
6 In particular, foreign
direct investment apparently increases when the dollar is relatively
weak, and conversely, although this would not be expected in perfect
capital markets.
What is particularly interesting is that the dollar was relatively very
strong during the several years immediately following the passage of the
1981 Tax Act and was very weak in the period surrounding the 1986 Tax
Act. Consequently, we are faced with an identification problem in sort-
ing out the independent contribution of tax rule changes and exchange
rate changes on acquisition behavior of foreign investors.
But it is also interesting to note that Froot and Stein (1989) find that the
relation between exchange rates and foreign direct investments in the
United States applies to the manufacturing sector but not the nonmanu-
facturing sector. Since it is the manufacturing sector where the invest-
ment tax credit and depreciation rule changes are most important, this
lends further credence to the role of taxes.
In addition, the weakness of the dollar surrounding passage of the
1986 Tax Act began in 1985. The fact that such a dramatic shift in foreign
acquisition activity began during the fourth quarter of 1986 rather than
earlier is further evidence suggesting the importance of taxes.
It is also worth noting that Froot and Stein find that the relation
between foreign direct investment and exchange rates is not significant
for the United Kingdom, Canada, or Japan. And although it is significant
for West Germany, the coefficient is only one-ninth as large as for the
United States. The one indication in Froot and Stein that exchange rates
are important in explaining foreign direct investment in the United
States is that the relation holds strongly during the 1970s, where tax
changes do not seem terribly significant in the United States.
6 For example, see Caves, Richard E. (1988). "Exchange-Rate Movements and Foreign
Direct Investments in the United States." Discussion Paper No 1383, Harvard Institute of
Economic Research, May; Froot, Kenneith A., and Stein, Jeremy C. (1989). "Exchange
Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An Imperfect Capital Markets Approach." Unpub-
lished working paper, February 19; Slemrod, Joel B. (1989). "Tax Effects on Foreign Direct
Investment in the U.S.: Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison." University of Michi-
gan and NBER working paper, January; and Swenson, Deborah. (1989). Unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, M.I.T. Department of Economics.22 Scholes & Wolfson
Recent evidence gathered by Deborah Swenson provides further sup-
port for our implicit tax hypothesis. Swenson shows that foreign direct
investment in the United States occurs most in those industries where
explicit tax rates are highest and hence implicit tax rates are lowest,
exactly as our model predicts. She also shows that the relation between
foreign direct investment and tax rates is stronger involving buyers from
countries facing worldwide tax systems than those facing territorial tax
systems, again as we would predict.
XIV. REINVESTMENT OF RETAINED EARNINGS
The analysis above considered whether new investment should be made
abroad or domestically. On the other hand, suppose we have already
made investments abroad. Assume further that our tax basis in the in-
vestment is $0 (e.g., we have already taken tax deductions for amounts
equal to our original investment). Earnings of $1 have been generated,
and local taxes of t( have been paid, leaving retained earnings of $l-t{.
Should $1—1( be reinvested locally or repatriated?
(a) Reinvestment locally for n periods at pretax rate Rf per period yields:
additional domestic tax on repatri-
... ation for the $1 of taxable income expression (4) .,. . ., <t1 , . r that gave rise to the $1 — tf in re-
tained earnings to begin with.
Conveniently, this simplifies to:
(1 + rfy (1 - td)
(b) Repatriation of 1 — tf, after attracting additional domestic tax of (td —
tf), invested domestically for n periods yields
[l-tt- (td - tf)] (1 + rdT = (1 + rdy (1 - td)
So here, the optimal policy is to repatriate, rather than reinvest abroad,
if, and only if, rd > rf. Moreover, this is true whether n is small or large.The Role of Tax Rules 23
XV. REINVEST VERSUS REPATRIATE WITH SUBPART
F-TYPE INVESTMENTS
The analysis above assumed that reinvestment abroad gave rise to do-
mestic tax deferral on all income generated abroad until such income is
repatriated. Passive (Subpart F) income is deemed to be repatriated as it
is earned. Although this might appear to be disadvantageous relative to
non-Subpart F income, this need not be so.
In particular, suppose that passive income earns the same pretax rate
whether invested abroad or domestically (e.g., Eurodollar bonds abroad
versus equally risky dollar-denominated bonds domestically). Then $1 pre-
tax income abroad, reduced by t{ for local tax, and reinvested locally at rate
R for n years (taxed each year domestically as Subpart F income) yields
(c) (1 - *f) [1 + K(l - Q" - (td - tt)
Additional tax at time n on repatriation
attributable to the $1 of taxable income that gave
rise to the \ — t{ initial retained earnings.
By contrast, immediate repatriation of 1 — tt gives rise to immediate
domestic tax of (td - tf), such that 1 - td gets invested domestically for n
periods:
(d) (1 - Q [1 + R(l - td)]
n
Note that (d) can be expanded to
(d') (l - td [1 + R(l - td)]
n - (td - t()[l + R(l - td)Y
Comparing (d') to (c), we see that as long as td > tt (as we have assumed),
(c) is larger by an n-period after-tax interest factor on the additional tax
due on repatriation. In (d), the immediate repatriation strategy, the tax is
paid immediately, whereas in (c), the local reinvestment strategy, it is
paid (without accretions for interest) in n periods.
XVI. INVESTMENT AND REPATRIATION POLICY
WHEN THE FOREIGN TAX RATE
EXCEEDS THE DOMESTIC TAX RATE
In the analysis above, comparisons of foreign and domestic investment
accumulations were complicated by the fact that repatriation of foreign24: Scholes & Wolfson
earnings gave rise to an additional tax. When the foreign tax rate exceeds
the domestic rate, repatriation triggers no additional tax (assuming that
there is no foreign withholding tax). With these assumptions, it is
straightforward to verify that foreign investment is preferred to domes-
tic investment, for any length investment horizon, if and only if r( > rd.
The same condition determines whether reinvestment abroad is pre-
ferred to repatriation of foreign retained earnings.
XVII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
U.S. tax reforms in the 1980s had profound consequences for optimal
investment and financing strategies of both domestic and foreign inves-
tors. Evidence indicates that taxpayers can be quite responsive to a
change in tax incentives. Although highly leveraged corporations have
fallen from favor of late on Wall Street the incentive to distribute corpo-
rate profits to investors in tax deductible ways is very strong under the
current tax regime. Unless the tax system is changed to make U.S. corpo-
rations less tax disfavored relative to partnerships, investment bankers
and other organization designers will continue to search for ways to gut
the corporate tax without introducing excessive nontax costs. If such
strategies are deemed to exact substantial social costs, U.S. legislators
might pause to wonder why their tax treatment of corporate profits is so
out of step with the way such activities are taxed by the rest of the world.